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Abstract 
We highlight that optimal cue combination does not represent a general principle of cue 
interaction during navigation, extending Rahnev & Denison’s (R&D) summary of nonoptimal 
perceptual decisions to the navigation domain.  However, we argue that the term 
‘suboptimality’ does not capture the way visual and nonvisual cues interact in navigational 
decisions.  
 
Main Text 
We appreciate Rahnev & Denison’s (R&D) brave target article for both its comprehensive 
summary of non-optimal perceptual decisions in various behaviours and its stringent critique 
of the conceptual shortcoming of optimality in characterizing human perception. 
Nonetheless, R&D’s description of non-optimal perceptual decisions as suboptimal suggests 
that they are still trapped by the “optimality doctrine”, rather than abandoning it. Taking 
studies of cue combination in navigation as an example, we argue (i) that perceptual 
decisions in navigation are not optimal in the sense of Bayesian theory, and (ii) that 
suboptimality does not capture the nature of cue interaction in navigation.  
 
Within the framework of the “Bayesian brain” (e.g., Knill & Pouget, 2004), researchers have 
argued that perceptual decisions in navigation are statistically optimal (Cheng, Shettleworth, 
Huttenlocher, & Rieser, 2007; Nardini, Jones, Bedford, & Braddick, 2008).  According to this 
view, when independent sources of spatial information (e.g., visual landmarks and idiothetic 
information about self-motion) are available for judging one’s location or orientation, they are 
combined based on the reliability of each source.  The greater the reliability of a source, the 
more heavily it is weighted in determining the navigator’s decision. Under certain 
circumstances, the relative weighting of visual and self-motion cues in human navigational 
decisions conforms nicely to the prediction of Bayesian integration (e.g., Chen, McNamara, 
Kelly, & Wolbers, 2017; Nardini et al., 2008; Zhao & Warren, 2015b; see also Xu, Regier, & 
Newcombe, 2017, for cue integration in spatial reorientation).  
 
However, optimal cue combination does not represent a general principle of cue interaction 
in navigational decisions.  For instance, it has difficulty accounting for the competition among 
spatial cues in determining the direction of locomotion.  Although visual and self-motion cues 
may be optimally integrated to reduce the variability of spatial judgments (e.g., Chen et al., 
2017; Naridni et al., 2008), these cues often compete to determine the direction in which a 
navigator should go (Tcheang, Bülthoff, & Burgess, 2011; Zhao et al., 2015b).  Visual cues 
often “veto” self-motion cues when they provide conflicting estimates of orientation or 
location; when such conflict becomes substantially large, the dominance reverts to self-
motion cues (Foo, Warren, Duchon, & Tarr, 2005; Zhao et al., 2015b; see Cheng et al., 
2007, for a review).  This competition between visual and self-motion information occurs in 
both human and nonhuman animal navigation, and manifests in terms of both behavioural 
and neurophysiological responses (e.g., Etienne & Jeffery, 2004; Yoder, Clark, & Taube, 
2011).  Such cue dominance in navigation indicates that spatial cues are not generally 
combined in a statistically optimal or even suboptimal fashion, posing a challenge to 
Bayesian optimality in navigation.  Without additional assumptions, the reliability-based 
theories of optimal cue combination predict neither the dominance of less reliable cues nor 
the co-existence of cue combination and cue competition in the same spatial judgment 
(Zhao et al., 2015b).  
 
Another challenge to optimal cue combination in navigation is that many factors irrelevant to 
cue reliability also modulate cue interactions.  One such factor is feedback about 
performance.  Distorted feedback can change the reliability of visual or self-motion cues and 
their combination during navigation (Chen et al., 2017).  Therefore, in addition to cue 
reliability per se, subjective evaluation of cue reliability also contributes to the weighting of 
spatial cues in navigation.  Another factor is related to previous experience.  Exposure to a 
stable visual environment can completely “silence” the contribution of self-motion cues to 
navigation (Zhao & Warren, 2015a), whereas experience with an unstable visual world can 
reduce or “switch off” the reliance on visual cues (Chen et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015a).  
Such experience-dependent cue interaction is observed in both human and nonhuman 
animal navigation (e.g., Knight et al., 2014), but is rarely considered in formulating optimal 
cue combination in navigation.  The last factor we want to highlight here is individual 
differences.  Optimal cue combination is often demonstrated at the group level.  However, 
whether spatial cues are combined and, if so, the optimality of integration can vary 
substantially between individuals (Chen et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2007; Nardini et al., 2008; 
Zhao & Warren, 2015b). 
 
As R&D mention, these challenges to Bayesian optimality might be addressed by adjusting 
assumptions about the likelihood, prior, cost function, decision rules (LPCD), and their 
combinations – although this renders Bayesian models unconstrained and unfalsifiable 
(Bowers & Davis, 2012; Jones & Love, 2011).  But before determining which components of 
LPCD are responsible for nonoptimal decisions, a prior question is why they should be 
optimal in the first place.  If perceptual decisions need not to be statistically optimal, then 
seeking the causes of suboptimality will not help us to build models of perception and 
cognition.  We see little evidence to justify such necessity.  For instance, optimal perceptual 
decisions assume that humans are rational decision makers, which is often not the case 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  In navigation, when two spatial cues point in different 
directions, optimally integrating them would lead one to walk somewhere in between, 
guaranteeing that one gets lost.  Ultimately, evolution does not necessarily produce optimal 
solutions, given the rates of natural selection and environmental change, pleiotropy and 
other structural constraints, the heterogeneity of populations, and the random effects of 
genetic drift.  
 
Without establishing the necessity of optimal cue combination in navigation, referring to the 
over- or under-weighting of cues as “suboptimal” still buys into the optimality approach.  It 
implies that spatial cues should interact in a Bayesian optimal manner, and if they do not, 
some aspects of LPCD need to be better-specified.  This approach runs the risk of 
overlooking the cognitive and neural processes that actually underlie cue interactions (see 
also Jones & Love, 2011). In fact, decades of research has shown that navigational 
decisions in mind and brain are often captured by one of two cues rather than their optimal –
or suboptimal – combination (Etienne & Jeffery, 2004; Yoder et al., 2011). 
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